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UNION PACIFIC/SOUTHERN PACIFIC
MERGER: IMPACT ON SHIPPERS

Paul D. Larson
University of Nevada-Reno
H. Barry Spraggins
University of Nevada-Reno

In the Summer of ‘96, Union Pacific Railroad merged with Southern Pacific to create the largest
American railroad. Controversy continues to surround the merger. This paper reports results of
a recent merger-impact survey. Survey respondents were rail and intermodal shippers. Among
the interesting research findings are the following: (1) while shippers report a negative impact due
to less rail competition, trackage rights granted to Burlington Northern/Santa Fe have failed to
dampen this impact; (2) railroad service has deteriorated, but freight rates have remained stable;
and (3) service problems are more severe for rail, as opposed to TOFC/COFC, shippers.
INTRODUCTION
Since merging with Southern Pacific, Union
Pacific Railroad has been in the news.
Headlines, such as “Union Pacific Says its
Network Jammed” and “Local Businesses
Steamed over Union Pacific Backlog,” tell a
tale of congested rail yards, late shipments,
missing rail cars, neglected customers and
overall poor service. As “Union Pacific’s
Problems Continue,” other headlines, like
“Union Pacific Faces Undoing Part of Merger”
and “Union Pacific Reports to Feds on Sendee
Meltdown,” suggest shipper and federal
responses to post-merger sendee problems.
These responses have included diversion of
traffic to motor carriers and requiring
submission of wreekly sendee reports to the U.
S. government, as wrell as talk of dismantling
the merger, opening up access to UP tracks,

and even railroad re-regulation.
Some
shippers are also laying their own tracks
(Machalaba 1998a).
The purpose of this paper is to report results of
a recent survey of shippers on the UP/SP
railroad merger. The second and third sections
briefly describe the merger and market area
suneyed-Reno/Sparks, Nevada. Then, the
fourth and fifth sections outline research
methods and present statistical results,
respectively. Finally, the paper closes with a
discussion on implications of the results for
transportation management.
The Merger
Union Pacific (UP) has sought control of
Southern Pacific (SP) since the dawm of this
century. In 1901, UP gained financial control of
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the Southern Pacific holding company which, in
turn, had control of both SP and the Central
Pacific (CP) railroads. (On May 10, 1869, UP
and CP linked together near Ogden, Utah to
form the first transcontinental railroad in
North America.)
But, in 1912, the U.S.
Supreme Court instructed UP to relinquish its
46 percent stake in SP. SP and CP merged in
1959 (Wilner 1997).
On July 3, 1996, the Surface Transportation
Board (STB) approved the UP/SP railroad
merger. This made UP the largest railroad in
the USA, with over 31,000 miles of track in 25
states. UP and Burlington Northern/Santa Fe
(BNSF) now control 90 percent of all rail
freight in the West. STB approval of the
merger came with conditions. One potentially
important condition for shippers involves the
trackage rights granted to BNSF on all “two-toone” lanes, i.e. lanes formerly served by both
UP and SP (Burke 1996).
Despite STB conditions, the merger was
opposed by several groups, including the
National Industrial Transportation League
(NITL). The N1TL is the nation’s largest
shipper group. According to Bradley (1995):
“Shippers worry that the (UP/SP) merger will
lead to reduced service-partly as a result of
possible line abandon-ments--and higher
rates.” The merger was also opposed by the
Coalition for Competitive Rail Transportation
and the United States Justice Department.
Before the merger, UP and SP operated a large
number of parallel lines. The consolidation of
parallel lines under one railroad affords an
opportunity to route faster intermodal trains
over one line and slower (e.g. coal) trains over
the other (Bradley 1997). Indeed, the UP/SP
merger application promised shippers faster
TOFC/COFC movement between Chicago and
both Northern and Southern California (Wilner
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1997). Faster movement of freight is a form of
improved service to shippers.
Consolidation of parallel lines, creating two-toone lanes, can also eliminate competition and
reduce incentives the remaining railroad has to
improve its service to shippers. In the UP/SP
merger, there were more than 130 two-to-one
points (Wilner 1998). This concern-that a
parallel or side-by-side merger will eliminate
competition and result in worse service--has
been confirmed in a prior shipper survey
(Anon. 1978).
Reno/Sparks
The railroad created Reno, Nevada.
CP
entered Northern Nevada from the West in
early 1868. Since the transcontinental railroad
was to be routed along the Truckee River,
towns such as Reno and Verdi emerged in the
Spring of 1868 (Miluck 1994).
Recently, the railroad has been a source of
controversy in Reno. Due to the UP/SP merger,
the number of freight trains rolling through
downtown Reno is expected to increase from
14 to 25 per day.
To handle increased
congestion at RR crossings, the federal
government recommends speeding up trains
through Reno, from 20 to 30 mph (Voyles
1998a). On the other hand, the Reno City
Council wants to keep the trains moving at 20
mph. The Council also wants UP to pay Si00
million toward lowering the tracks into a
trench under downtown Reno (Voyles 1998b).
Reno-area rail shippers have also been in the
news recently. Shippers across a variety of
industries--from automobiles to utilities to
building supplies, for instance--have reported
service problems with UP, the only (rail) show
in town. An auto dealer complains about a
shipment of 50 new cars being ten days late-and counting. The regional power company is

down to an 18-day supply of coal, but a 30 to 40day supply is desired. A building supply
wholesaler reports three to four week delivery
delays on incoming materials. Shippers that
have alternatives are starting to shift freight to
trucks and/or work with BNSF (Henderson
1997).
The Reno/Sparks market area is fertile ground
for understanding the impact of the UP/SP
merger on rail and intermodal shippers. The
two former railroads linked up at Reno, due to
the old UP branch line North of town.
Moreover, each railroad had an intermodal
terminal in the area, and there are a variety of
rail and intermodal shippers in Northern
Nevada. In short, the merger made Reno, “the
biggest little city in the world,” a two-to-one
point.
RESEARCH METHODS
Survey data were collected by telephone, and
primarily analyzed using t-tests. A list of likely
Northern Nevada rail and inter-modal shippers
was developed, through consultation with
Reno-area logistics and transportation
professionals. This list was given to a research
bureau at a major University in the West.
Bureau staff performed the telephone survey,
which lasted approximately ten minutes per
completed call. The first survey question asked
shippers to estimate the percent of their
inbound and outbound freight (by weight)
moved by each of the following modes: TOFC/
COFC, rail, truckload, less-than-truckload
(LTL) and “other.”
If the percent of
TOFC/COFC plus rail freight was zero, for both
inbound and outbound movement, the shipper
was thanked and spared further questioning.
Bureau staff completed surveys with over 30
shippers, representingan estimated 80 percent
of rail and inter-modal freight moving into and
out of the Reno/Sparks area.

The survey included questions on rail
transportation sendee and overall logistics
performance, before and after the merger.
Transportation service attributes were drawn
from the literature, e.g. Coyle and colleagues
(1994).
Additional questions probe the
expected impact of merger-related changes,
such as abandonment of a branch line North of
Reno, BNSF trackage rights, and closing of one
intermodal facility.
STATISTICAL RESULTS
Overall Impact of Merger-related Changes
Table 1 reveals the overall impact of certain
merger-related changes on shipper operations.
On average, shippers perceive the impact of
BNSF trackage rights over UP/SP lines to be
slightly positive—but not statistically
significant. While the impact of closing the
intermodal (TOFC/COFC) facility in North
Reno is perceived to be negative, this impact is
also not statistically significant (at alpha <
.05).
A second TOFC/COFC terminal, in
Sparks, remains open to serve intermodal
shippers.
However, the impact of abandonment of the UP
branch line from Reno-Stead North to
Hallelujah Junction, California, is perceived to
be negative (t = -2.99) and significant (p-value
= .003). Prior to the merger, this branch line
was UP’s sole path to Reno. Western Pacific
(WP) ran this branch line North from Reno to
Hallelujah Junction until 1982, w hen UP gained
control of both Missouri Pacific (MP) and WT
(Tardy 1998; Wilner 1997).
The impact of reduced railroad competition,
due to the merger, is also perceived by
Northern Nevada rail shippers to be negative (t
= -5.22) and significant (p-value = .000). This
result confirms the findings of a 1978Railway
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TABLE 1
IMPACT OF MERGER-RELATED CHANGES ON OPERATIONS*
Change

Average Impact

t

p-value

BN/SF Trackage Rights

.03

.44

.332

Closing of Intermodal Facility

-.21

-1.65

.055

Branch Line Abandonment

-.48

-2.99

.003

Less Rail Competition

-.79

-5.22

.000

* scaled from -2 (very negative) to 2 (very positive), with 0 = no impact.

Age shipper survey on rail mergers. Only 3
percent of respondents to that survey favored
operating in a region served by a single
railroad, and the other 97 percent opposed
such an arrangement (Anon. 1978).
Impact of Merger on Logistics Performance
Table 2 shows shipper perceptions of rail
freight performance changes, before and after
the merger. Performance is measured in terms
of freight rates, service availability, transit
time, on-time delivery and total logistics costs.
A recent Mercer survey of shippers reports that
“timeliness” (transit time and on-time delivery)
are especially important to intermodal shippers
(Anon. 1996).

Shippers responding to the current survey
indicated that freight rates are slightly worse
(i.e. higher) after the merger, but the change is
not statistically significant (see Table 2).
However, railroad performance is reported to
have deteriorated on all of the other measures,
as follows: service availability (t = -3.77),
transit time (t = -5.11), on-time delivery (t = 7.10) and total logistics costs (t = -3.42). It is
interesting to note that total logistics costs of
moving freight via rail have increased--even
though freight rates have not. Apparently,
shippers are feeling the cost impact of poor
service. A lack of timeliness means higher
inventory carrying and stockout costs for
shippers.

TABLE 2
POST-MERGER PERFORMANCE CHANGES*
Average Change

t

p-value

Freight Rates

-.03

-.37

.356

Service Availability

-.66

-3.77

.001

Transit Time

-.97

-5.11

.000

On-time Delivery

-1.17

-7.10

.000

Measure

Total Logistics
-.55
-3.42
Costs
* scaled from -2 (much worse) to 2 (much better), with 0 = same.
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TABLE 3
UP/SP PERFORMANCE: BEFORE & AFTER THE MERGER
Performance Factor

Before Merger

After Merger

8.6
88.1%

17.8

Average Transit Time (days)
On-time Delivery'

The survey also asked shippers to estimate
average transit time (days) and on-time
delivery (percent) provided by the railroad,
before and after the merger. These results are
presented in Table 3. Note that average transit
time has more than doubled, from 8.6 to 17.8
days, since the UP/SP merger. As transit time
doubles, so does in-transit or pipeline stock.
Moreover, percent of deliveries on-time has
fallen from 88.1 to 50.8 percent. Reduced
delivery reliability implies higher destination
safety stock.

percent of the respondents replied “no” to this
question, 24 percent said “yes.” The remaining
17 percent expressed no opinion. An openended follow-up question simply asked
shippers “why” they replied yes or no to the
dismantling question.
Reasons given by the yes (dismantle) group
include:
“it (UP) is a monopoly now, employees are
extremely rude”

Shipper Reactions to the Merger
As shippers perceive a lack of rail competition-and a decline in service levels--one reasonable
reaction is to divert traffic from railroad to
motor carrier.
Bearth (1997) reports an
increase in freight diversion, from rail and
intermodal to truck, especially due to the UP
situation.
The survey asked shippers to
estimate the percent of rail and TOFC/COFC
traffic (by weight) diverted to truck since the
merger.
These Reno-area shippers have
diverted an average of 9.8 percent of their
traffic to motor carrier. The percent of traffic
diverted ranged from 0 to 48 percent.

50.8%

“no competition, merger is disastrous”
“poor management, unprepared, not being
corrected”
“service was better when they (UP and SP)
were separate”
-

“lack of competition has raised prices”

Among the reasons given by the no group were
the following:
“don’t think it (dismantling) would change
anything”
“merger itself is not the problem”

A more extreme reaction is to advocate
dismantling the merger. Machalaba (1998b)
asserts that momentum toward an
unprecedented partial dismantling of the
UP/SP merger has been building. The survey
asked shippers: “Do you believe the UP/SP
merger should be dismantled?” While 59

“it would be more of a mess than it is now”
“(they, i.e. UP) just need to improve
service”
-

“what alternative is there?”
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Impact of Merger on Intermodal vs. Rail
Shippers
Table 4 compares the merger impact on
intermodal (TOFC/COFC) vs. rail shippers.
The Mercer shipper survey found 48 percent of
its respondents agreeing that rail mergers will
make TOFC/COFC more attractive (Anon.
1996). Unfortunately, according to Thomas

(1998), service problems at UP are stunting
intermodal's growth. UP handles a substantial
share of the intermodal volume in the USA.
Since most TOFC/COFC shippers can switch to
motor carriers with relative ease (Greenfield
1998), negative impacts of the merger should
be stronger for rail—rather than
intermodal—shippers. Rail shippers tend to be
more captive.

TABLE 4
IMPACT OF MERGER ON INTERMODAL VS. RAIL SHIPPERS
Impact Itema
Closing of Intermodal Facility
Branch Line Abandonment
On-time Delivery
Transit Time

Intermodal Shippers
-.18
-.09
-.73
-.45

Rail Shippers
-.22
-.72
-1.44
-1.28

t
.15b
2.27°
2.26b
1.96c

p-value
.440
.016
.016
.036

aFor closing facility and line abandonment, impact is scaled from -2 (very negative) to 2 (very
positive), with 0 = no impact. For on-time delivery and transit time, impact is scaled with -2 (much
worse) to 2 (much better), with 0 = same.
‘ t-statistic based on pooled variances
Ct-statistic based on separate variances

The difference between intermodal and rail
shippers’ perceptions on the impact of closing
the North Reno TOFC/COFC terminal are not
statistically significant. Both groups expressed
a modest, negative impact (see Table 4). On
the other hand, the negative impact of
abandonment of the North-bound branch line is
stronger for rail shippers, as opposed to
intermodal shippers. The difference between
the two groups (t = 2.27; p-value = .016) is
significant at the .05 level.
Post-merger railroad performance, in terms of
on-time delivery and transit time, declined for
both intermodal and rail shippers. However,
rail shippers report a greater service slide,
compared to TOFC/COFC shippers, on both ontime delivery (-1.44 vs. -.73) and transit time (1.28 vs. -.45). Table 4 shows that these
differences are statistically significant. It
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appears that UP is doing a better job serving
its intermodal customers, as opposed to its rail
customers. Still, the merger hardly seems to be
making intermodal transportation more
attractive for shippers.
IMPLICATIONS FOR TRANSPORTATION
MANAGEMENT
This section combines implications of the
results for carriers (e.g. UP) and government
agencies (e.g. the STB), since both are involved
in transportation management.
It must be noted that the results are based on
a relatively small sample of shippers in one
area of the West (Northern Nevada). Further
research is needed to expand investigation of
the merger impact, by including a larger, more
geographically diverse group of shippers

The results compel a person to question
conventional wisdom on trackage rights, as
conditions for STB approval of rail mergers.
Trackage rights are supposed to assuage
shipper concerns about less rail competition,
especially at two-to-one points like
Reno/Sparks. However, shippers respondingto
the survey felt quite concerned about reduced
rail competition since the UP/SP
merger—despite trackage rights granted to
BNSF. Survey results also suggest that a
railroad can close one TOFC/COFC terminal
(for consolidation purposes), without upsetting
shippers, as long as a second terminal remains
open.

There are two main reasons shippers may fear
two-to-one points and less rail competition:
higher rates and wrorse service. It is nteresting
o note that shippers participating in this survey
reported a general deterioration of service
since the merger, but no significant ncrease in
freight rates. It seems UP is not using its
monopoly situation in Northern Nevada to raise
rates. Or, perhaps UP’s sendee problems are
not all merger-related. As one expert observes,
even before the merger, Union Pacific was
experiencing “unprecedented problems with
sendee” (Welty 1995).
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